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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
H. C. TEBBS,
Plaintiff and App·elfant,

vs.

Case
No. 7707

LYNN PETERSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from the judgment of dismissal
entered upon the second trial. At the first trial a nonsuit was granted because it clearly appeared from the
evidence that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence.
The collision occurred about four or five miles
west of Duchesne, on the 5th of January, 1947, at
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about 8:00 P.M., when the plaintiff drove his car
into the rear end of the defendant's truck, which was
proceeding towards Duchesne just ahead of the plai~
tiff. The question at the last trial in April, 19 51, was
the same as at the first, which occurred in October,
1948, to wit: Was plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence? which involves the further question as to
whether plaintiff should have been permitted to go to
the jury in vie·w of an about-face in his testimony,
in an attempt to make a case, which on the first trial
he did not have.

POINT RELIED UPON
That it appears from the record that appellant's
evidence at the first trial clearly shows that he was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. That his evi~
dence at the last trial, wherein he endeavors to excul~
pate himself, is so manifestly contrary to his former
statements under oath as to justify the court in dis~
regarding it.

ARGUMENT
How far was the truck beyond the curve in the
highway? At what distance did plaintiff see or should
he have seen the truck after rounding the curve? What
opportunity did he have to either pass to the left
of the truck or to stop before colliding with it? What
was the evidence at the first trial? What is the evidence
at the second trial? Will the courts permit a plaintiff
to trifle with the court by altering his testimony to
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make a case, when on the first trial it affirmatively
appeared that he had no case?
EVIDENCE AT FIRST TRIAL
At the first trial, plaintiff, then represented by
attorneys Dillman and Shields, first fixed the point
of impact of plaintiffs car with defendanf s truck at
the east end of the curve referred to in the evidence
(Tr. 34). The following day, after further consideration, he changed his testimony and fixed the point of
impact where the letters "HCT" appear in black on
Exhibit 1, which point is approximately 275 feet
east of the east end of the curve (Tr. 3 7). He further
testified at the first trial that he was traveling about
40 miles per hour (Tr. 4 3) and that with his lights
at low beam, he could see about 200 feet (Tr. 32).
Three times during the trial of the Hirose case (which
arose out of the same collision) plaintiff stated that he
was not over 12 feet away when he first saw the truck
(Tr. 34 and 40) and later in the first trial of his own
case he stated he could not have been over 20 feet away
(Tr. 34), which statement he later amended to fix the
distance at 50 feet (Tr. 34).
With reference to cars approaching the truck from
the opposite direction, he stated:

"Q. No\.v, Mr. Tebbs, calling your attention to your testimony at the last trial:
'Q. Well didn't you tell us, Mr.
Tebbs, that the truck that you saw on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~ighway, or the object, was about 12 feet

1n front of you when you first saw it?
'A.

That's right, when I saw it.

'Q. Then you were watching ahead
of you, weren't you?
'A. Well, the only thing that has
got me there, if I may answer, there could
have been a car coming that might have
blinded me somewhat.

'Q. Well, was there a car coming?
Did you see any car coming?
'A.

I don't know.

'Q. Well, in other words, the fact
there could have been a car coming is just
a possibility, you don't remember anything like that do you at this time?
'A.

''Q.

I don't.

Did you so testify?

"A. I did, but may I state I was thinking of lights, not car; if you are blinded, you
can't see a car.

"Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you tell
us before that vrhen you testified, the reason you
didn't see the truck was as you came east around
the curve your lights shot off the highway and
when you suddenly straightened out to go east
on the straight-of-way, the truck was right in
front of you. Didn't you so testify?
"A. I think so; yes sir, that's right.
"Q. The last time we were over here on
this case, we were here about three and a half
days, were we not?
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"A.

I \Vas, yes sir.

"Q. And other than vvhat you said, it
vvas a possibility there \Vas a car could have
blinded you there wasn't anything said about
lights any time during the trial, \Vas there?
"A.
ber of.

This was the only instance I remem-

"Q. And your testimony at that time
that was a mere possibility; isn't that right?
"A. That was right as to lights, but as
to car, I don't contend I ever saw a car. I was
blinded; that is the confusion of that testimony.
"Q. And here we are now, April 30,
19 51, and you say your memory is clearer now
and you remember being blinded by lights?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And you put that in your complaint
this time when you re-filed your suit, didn't
you?
"A. Yes.
"Q. After you talked to your lawyers,
you decided those lights were there?
"A. Well, I always had it in mind there
was a light, whether it was a motorcycle or an
automobile, I don't know, but I was blinded."
(Tr. 40-41.)
It will be noted that plaintiff endeavors to explain away his testimony that he did not kno\V
whether he saw any car coming, by stating that he was
thinking "of lights, not car." (Tr. 40.) If he was
thinking of lights, then he evidently meant to say that
he saw no lights approaching from the east when he
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was asked if he saw a car. He also testified that the
reason he did not see the truck was that as he rounded
the curve, his lights shot off the highway and as he
straightened out on the straight-of-way, the truck was
right in front of him (Tr. 40-41). The one lane of
travel was clear so that he might have passed to the
left of the truck (Tr. 42). He testified that his lights
on low beam revealed objects 200 feet away; that he
did not see the truck until he was within 12 feet of it
or 20 feet of it (Tr. 40, 32). He fixed the location of
the point of impact at the first trial where the letters
"HCT" in black appear on Exhibit 1, approximately
2 7 5 feet east of the east end of the curve (Tr. 3 5).
EVIDENCE AT THE SECOND TRIAL
Plaintiff testified that he was blinded 'by the
lights of an oncoming vehicle when he was "around
the turn about 100 f2et"; that he was traveling approximately 40 miles per hour; that although he could
have seen the truck 150 feet avvay, "coming that fast"
he did not have time to turn left around it (Tr. 4 3);
that the one lane of the high\vay was clear (Tr. 44);
that there v1as a large rock protruding into the road
as he werit around the curve, v1hich obstructed his
vision and a mountain which goes back a long way
"you can't see around," (Tr. 16); that the r-eE-k was
located "300 feet or a little more"1 ~estfrom the truck
(Tr. 16 Lthat-the--strortg -ltgpt blinded him when he
was "probably 50 to 7D
I can't say," tram-the
truck ( T r. 16: 1 7) ; that his brakes were in good con-

fee-t,
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\1>!<:1S

asked if b.e savJ a £21:.•

He also tcst-

i fied th<:1t the reason he did not see the
trucl--. '.1-rns that as he rou.nd~-;d the curve,
hls li.ghts shot off the 11ig_hv;ay r.·tnd as he

straightened out on the straigh.t-of -way,
the tr·uck ~Iss right in front of him ( Tr.
h0-41). The one ··lane of travel \"las clear
so t.hat he r~ivht have passed to the left

of the truck (Tr. 42).

He testified that

his l·Ights on lo~r beam revealed objects
;:oo feet a:t•lay; that hP, did not see the

until he was within 12 feet of it
feet of it (Tr. 40, 32). He fixed
the locat~ion of the point of impact at
the first trial where the letters "HCT"
in blnck appear on Exhibit 1, approximately
275 feet east of the east end of the curve
( rrr. 3 5) •

t~1ck

or

20

Plaintiff testified that he was
blinded by the lifhts of an oncoming vehicle wilen he was n a.rov.nd the tnrn about
100 feet"; tha-t he ·w-as traveling approxil:l.ately 40 rniles per hour; that although
be could have seen the t.ruck 150 feet av;ay,
n coming that fast n he did not have time to
turn left around it ('rr. 4.3); that the one
lane of t~he high''i'..'UY was clear ( 'fr. 44) ;
that there \'las n la.rge rock protruding into
the ro.r"d as he went ttround the curve, tt.J"hich
obstructed his vi::don and .;:;1 rnount.ain ~;'l]'hich

goes back a lon.':_: way "you can't see around,"
(Tr. 16); "That the truck lttas located u300
feet or a little rnoren southeast fro:;" the
turn ('rr. 16); that he first observed the
·truck 1-rhen he was rrprobably 50 to 70 feet,
I the S.J.
can't
16-17);
that
braktl
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clition; that the truck had no taillight (Tr. 18) and
that the truck \Vas located
the point on Exhibit 1
where he has marked a: red cross with the letters
"HCT,. in black (Tr. 3 8), which is probably 125
feet east of the east end of the curve.
Hirose testified that ttvo cars came with bright
lights which made him blind (Tr. 4), and that '\ve
come to that rock and the turn, then at the same time
big light come into us, make us blind,,. (Tr. 5); that
there was no taillight on the truck and he first saw the
truck ·when they were within 40 feet of it (Tr. 5),
although at the first trial he stated that he first savv
the truck w·hen he was within 200 feet of it (Tr. 11;
however, ·when confronted with this later statement,
he said, "I told you 200 feet but I don't know much
at that time though" (Tr. II). Like Tebbs, who said
that at the trial in October, 1948, he was very nervous and upset and "I di-dn't put the study and thought
on it that I have now," (Tr. 39) Hirose seems also to
have put some study on it and was therefore much
better informed in 19 51 than he was in 1948.
In addition to the testimony of plaintiff and
Hirose, other evidence on plaintiff's behalf at the second trial is to the effect that the front lights of Peterson's truck were on (Tr. 64); that Marchant and
Wilkinson on their way west from Duchesne and at a
point about a mile or a mile and a half east of the place
of collision, were passed by a car going in the same direction they were traveling (Tr. 71) -this to create
the inference that it was the car with the blinding

at
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lights, but there was no evidence that this car ever
arrived at the place of the collision, or whether it turned
out on some side road; however, it is a straw at which
plaintiff grasps. Aside from the fact that it is altogether improbable and unreasonable that Marchant
and Wilkinson could in April, 19 51, recall that a car
passed them at some particular point on a highway
four years and three months prior to the date of their
statement, their testimony does nothing more than to
create an inference that this particular car proceeded
to the place where the collision occurred, and based
upon this inference is another inference that it had the
bright lights which plaintiff claims blinded him. This
is basing one inference upon another inference, which
is not allowable. (Utah Foundry Co. v. Utah Gas 8
Coke Co., 42 Utah 533, 131 P. 1173).
It is remarkable that plaintiffs memory in April,
19 5 1, two and one-half years after the first trial, is so
much better than at the first trial in October, 1948,
one year and a half after the event; however, he confirms his first statement that the truck was located
approximately 275 feet east of the east end of the
curve, by admitting at the seconq trial that in rounding
the rock at the curve he was "300 feet or a little more"
from the truck ( T r. 16) . However, the most serious
departure from his testimony relates to the blinding
lights of an oncoming car. From a statement at the
first trial that there was just a possibility that he was
blinded but that he remembered no car (Tr. 40-41),
he stated at the second trial:
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"Q. How do you account for that Mr.
Tebbs, that when two years have gone byLet's say this trial was in O~tober 1948, and vve
are now in 19 51, and you say your memory is
clearer now that it was at that time?
"A. I was very nervous and upset and I
didn't put the study and thought on it that I
have now. My best recollection now is that I
was blinded." (Tr. 39.)
and again he stated "my recollection today is positive
I was blinded." (Tr. 40,) \Vhether he was blinded
by the one light or two, he does not know (Tr. 41).
The light could have been from a motorcycle (Tr. 42).
In any event, he does not claim that there were lights
from two cars, as did Hirose (Tr. 4). Plaintiff attempts to escape the purport of his testimony at the
first trial by the transparently ridiculous statement that
at the first trial he was asked about seeing a ''car," not
"lights" (Tr. 42); this to make it appear that his
present statement that he was blinded by lights is consistent with his former statement that he savv no car.
Is it not passing strange that plaintiff, of course
without the merest suggestion from anyone, worked
out such a fine distinction? Is it not strange that, likewise, at the second trial, plaintiff came to realize how
important it was for him to be blinded by lights in
order to bring his case within technical rules of law
announced in this court's decisions that blinding lights
will, under some circumstances, relieve a plain tiff from
the charge of contributory negligence? How strange
that the plaintiff was able to educate himself and his
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memory between the first trial and the second as to
what evidence defeated him at the first trial and what
changes were necessary to give him a chance to win at
the second. How important it was to make it appear
that it was not his fast driving or the fact that in
rounding the curve ncoming that fast" (Tr. 43), his
lights shot off the highway, w·hich prevented him from
seeing the truck 300 feet or more away, but that he
failed to see the truck because he was blinded by oncoming lights. His becoming blinded just had to be
in the case or he had no case and it would never do to
have it appear from the record that when his lights
would reveal objects 200 feet away, he did not see the
truck until he was within 12 feet of it or within 20
feet of it. That of itself would show gross carelessness, so he tries to make a somewhat better showing by
now stating that although he could have seen the truck
150 feet away (Tr. 4 3), the ct tha /he was blinded
by the bright lights when
was :g obably 50-70 feet
away from the truck ( - . 16-1
caused him to collide with it. This e ·aence s ws that he traveled at
least 80 feet whi the true could have been seen by
him before the tghts bli ed him, so he had plenty of
opportunit to stop nd a
J.j.djng ,Fitb_i!;
(Hanson v. Clyde, 89 Ut. 31; 56 P. (2nd) 1366).
The facts in this case as developed at the first trial
are practically- the same as in the case ofDalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Company, 80 Ut. 331; 15 P.
(2nd) 309, the only exception being that the straightof-way approching the truck in the Dalley case was
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memory between the first trial and the
second ae to what evidence defeated him
at the first trial s.nd what changes were
necessary to give him a chance to win at
the second. How important it was to make
it anr.ear that it \faa not his fast driving
the ract that in rounding the curve
"eoming that fast" (Tr. 43), his lights
shot oft the highway, which prevented him
from seeing the truck 300 feet or n~r•
away, but that he failed to see the truck
because he was blinded by the oncoming
lights. His becoming blinded just had
to be in the case or he had no case and
it would never do to have it appear from
the record that when his lights would reveal objects 200 teet away, he did not
see the truck until he was within 12 teet
of it or within 20 feet of it. That ot
itself would show gross carelessness, so
he tries to make a somewhat better show•
ing by now stating that although he could
have seen the truek 150 feet away (Tr. 43),
the £act that he was blinded by the bright
lights when he was probably 50-70 teet
awa.y from the truck (Tr. 16-17) caused him
to collide with it. {Hanson v. Clyde, g9

or

Ut. 31;

;6 P (2nd} 1366).

The facts in this ease as developed at the first trial are practically
the same as in the ease or Dalley v.
Midwestern Dairy Products Company, 80
Ut. 331; 15 P (2nd) 309, the only exception being that the straight of l'Jay approaching the truek in ·che Dalley case was
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longer than the 300-foot straight-of-way bet\veen the
east end of the curve and the defendant's truck in this
case. It appeared in the Dalley case that Dalley' 8 car
was equipped with good lights and good brakes; that
the lights on his car \vould disclose ordinary objects
about 200 feet ahead; that Dalley did not see the truck
until he was within 15 or 20 feet of it; that there \Vere
no lights on the rear end of the truck; that he \vas keeping a constant lookout ahead; that just before he
struck the truck, he was traveling on the right side of
the road and the truck \vas on the right side of the road
but the lights of his car did not reveal a car until he
\vas \Vithin 15 or 20 feet from \Vhere it was standing
and that if the truck had been equipped with a tail
light he ·would have been able to see the truck in tin1e
to stop or turn out; that he \Vas unable to stop or turn
his car so as to avoid collision after he discovered the
truck. Counsel's remark that the Dalley case ~Nas decided by a 3-2 decision and that it has been subject to
some adverse criticism, should not lessen his good opinion of it. Rather, as the author of it, he can l-:'2ve a
sense of pride in the fact that no criticism which has
been offered against the decision has been sufficient to
overcome it.
In Gohlinghorst vs. Ruess, 146 Neb. 475, 20
N. W. (2nd) 381, plaintiff's testimony as to facts
concerning the collision, was contrary to her deposition
in another case in vrhich she was not a party. The court
for that reason affirmed a dismissal of her case. To
quote:
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"It is the contention of the defendants that
where a plaintiff materially changes her sworn
testimony in this manner to meet the exigencies
arising in the trial of the case that it is discredited as a matter of lavv and should be disregarded.
"We think the testimony of plaintiff was
such that it cannot sustain a judgment in her
favor. A plaintiff may not recite upon oath one
statement of facts in one judicial proceeding and
then, to meet the exigencies of the occasion in
the trial of a different suit, recite under oath an
entirely different story. As was said in Gormley v. Peoples Cab, Inc., 142 Neb. 346, 12 SCJ

31, 6 N. W. (2d) 78:
lSuch conduct cannot be tolerated to
the extent, when it is clearly apparent, of
requiring a trial judge to submit the credibility of such testimony to a jury, and of
permitting a party to mock law and justice.'

*

*

*

*

"The convenient loss of memory to escape
the fatal effect of positive sworn testimony on
the one hand, and in amazing resurrection of
memory more than two years later as to facts
and incidents tending to make a case, make the
evidence incredible as a matter of law in the abscence of any reasonable expanation of the conflict.

*

*

*

*

"It is the general rule in this jurisdiction
that in a jury trial when the defendant moves
for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs
evidence, such motion must be treated as an admission of the truth of all rna terial and relevant
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evidence and all proper inferences to be drawn
therefrom, and if the evidence so considered
tends to sustain the allegations of the petition,
and the petition states a cause of action, the case
should be submitted to the jury. But this rule
does not control where it appears that other evidence of the plaintif demonstrates conclusively,
or to a degree that the minds of reasonable men
cannot differ thereon, that such evidence favorable to plaintiff is incapable of belief."
See also Peterson vs. R.R. Co. (Neb.) 2 78
N. W. 561; Ellis vs. Omaha Cold
Storage Co. (Neb.) 250 N. W. 760.
In Smith v. R. R. Co., 184 Fed. 387, the court
uses this language:
''As the inconsistency is in the testimony
of a party, a stricter rule is applicable than where
the inconsistency is in the testimony of an ordinary witness. * * * While it is true that upon
a second trial the plaintiffs case may be changed
or strengthened by new testimony, yet the right
of a plaintiff at a second trial to make by his
own testimony a complete departure from the
case presented at the first trial is not unlimited.
A plaintiff, we think, having sworn to facts
resting in his own observation and kno·wledge
before one jury, should not be permitted to
swear to facts directly inconsistent and to obtain
from a second jury a verdict in his favor ·which
will involve the conclusion that his· testimony
at the first trial was knowingly false. A party
testifying under oath is more than mere witness.
He is an actor seeking the intervention of the
judicial power in his behalf, and thus subject
to the rule ~allegans contraria non est audiendus,'
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which, as stated in Broom's Legal Maxims, page
130, 'expresses in technical language the trite
saying of Lord Kenyon that a man should not
be permitted to "blow hot and cold" v1ith reference to the same transaction, or insist at different times, on the truth of each of two conflicting
allegations according to the promptings of his
private interest.' "
See

also Hamilton vs. Frothingham,
(Mich.) 40 N. VI. 15.

In Steele v. R. R. Co., (1\tlo.) 175 S. W. 177,
the court remarks:
"\Ve are not bound, even as appellate
court, to believe a mere witness in a case where
it appears from conclusive physical facts or
otherwise patently that such evidence is either
perjured or clearly mistaken. Why then are we
compelled to beleive a litigant swearing for himself under the same circumstances."

In Insurance Co. v. Bonacci, Ill Fed. (2) 412,
the court declares that a party cannot in his own case
be heard by a court to deny what he solemnly sv1ore
was true yesterday.
This case is not only important from the standpoint of the interest of the parties involved; it is also
important because it will give the courts and the legal
profession an opportunity to ascertain whether this
court will tolerate trifling in judicial proceedings. This
is no case where a witness made an honest mistake in
his testimony, which, of course, he should always be
permitted to correct on timely application, but after
revealing the facts to the counsel he first employed,
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and deliberately testifying in support of his complaint
as to all the facts and circumstances surrounding tbe
coilision, plaintiff employs other counsel to whom,
two years and a half follovring the first trial, and after
he had put more study and thought on it, (Tr. 39)
he revealed other facts, to wit: That the truck was
located near the east end of the curve, and that positively, and without any question, he \Vas blinded with
lights, which fact his former employed, Hirose, confirms. To prove that the impact occurred nearer the
end of the curve, plaintiff states that he found certain
bits of chrome which he identified as a part of his car
and ·which he picked up when, in company with bis
son, he went back to the highway two months after
he got out of the hospital (Tr. 50). He had been confined to the hospital for nearly six weeks (Tr. 21),
so he picked up the chrome more than one hundred
days after the collision and after the highway had been
covered with snow and sleet and in all likelihood,
scraped by highway machinery (Tr. 56-57), all of
which conditions rendered the evidence of \Vhere the
chrome was found absolutely worthless as tending to
prove where the collision occurred.
As much as we regret the necessity of such a statement, we say that there could not be a more obvious
"doctoring" of testimony in order to avoid the consequences of prior statements under oath, and in order to
avoid the rule in the Dalley case and to make applicable
the doctrine of the Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 U t. 40 1;
62 P. (2nd) 117, case with respect to blit?-ding lights.
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We respectfully submit that the trial court was
clearly justified in holding that "the plaintiff is bound
by the testimony given in the former hearingu and that
even if plaintiff was blinded by lights he should have
slowed down.
STEWART, CANNON ~ HANSON
AND

E. F.

BALDWIN, JR.,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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